

FIXING INTELLIGENCE AND ACHIEVING OMNISCIENCE

BY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2011

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 11-03-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Fixing Intelligence and Achieving Omniscience				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Ms. Beth A. Williams				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Professor Daniel Coulter Department of National Security and Strategy				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT With the July 2010 Senate confirmation of the fourth Director of National Intelligence (DNI), following the contentious resignation of Dennis Blair in the spring of 2010, the position and the office came under a tremendous amount of scrutiny. The DNI and the Office of the DNI (ODNI), established in 2005 in the aftermath of significant intelligence failures including the 9/11 attacks, were designed to gain control and provide clear direction to the expansive Intelligence Community (IC) to improve intelligence collection and analysis. This paper reviews how the Office of the Director of National Intelligence came to be; examines the effect of the position and the office on the IC and recent changes to the office that have had or may have an impact on the efficacy of the community; discusses what the real issues may be for the IC; and concludes with a look at concrete changes, such as joint all-source analysis, that could be implemented to drive the community forward and a little closer to achieving omniscience.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS DNI, ODNI, Intelligence Community, Intelligence Analysis, All-source Analysis, Joint Duty, IRTPA, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 30	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Ms. Beth A. Williams

TITLE: Fixing Intelligence and Achieving Omniscience

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 11 March 2010 WORD COUNT: 6,503 PAGES: 30

KEY TERMS: DNI, ODNI, Intelligence Community, Intelligence Analysis, All-source Analysis, Joint Duty, IRTPA, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

With the July 2010 Senate confirmation of the fourth Director of National Intelligence (DNI), following the contentious resignation of Dennis Blair in the spring of 2010, the position and the office came under a tremendous amount of scrutiny. The DNI and the Office of the DNI (ODNI), established in 2005 in the aftermath of significant intelligence failures including the 9/11 attacks, were designed to gain control and provide clear direction to the expansive Intelligence Community (IC) to improve intelligence collection and analysis. This paper reviews how the Office of the Director of National Intelligence came to be; examines the effect of the position and the office on the IC and recent changes to the office that have had or may have an impact on the efficacy of the community; discusses what the real issues may be for the IC; and concludes with a look at concrete changes, such as joint all-source analysis, that could be implemented to drive the community forward and a little closer to achieving omniscience.

FIXING INTELLIGENCE AND ACHIEVING OMNISCIENCE

With the July 2010 Senate confirmation of the fourth Director of National Intelligence (DNI), following the contentious resignation of Dennis Blair in the spring, the position and the office have come under a tremendous amount of scrutiny. The DNI and the Office of the DNI (ODNI), established in 2005 in the aftermath of significant intelligence failures including the 9/11 attacks, were designed to gain control and provide clear direction to the expansive United States Intelligence Community (IC) to improve intelligence collection and analysis. How effective has this been?

According to some analysts, the DNI has been ineffective at best and detrimental at worst in leading the IC, and the office should be dismantled immediately. They further argue the community was considerably more effective under the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Community Management Staff (CMS); and the 16 agencies and organizations of the world's largest intelligence apparatus should revert to the DCI model. Others note there have been moderate, but important, improvements in the ability of the community to function with a common purpose in collecting, processing, analyzing and, significantly, sharing actionable information with national, military, and law enforcement (national, state, local, and tribal level) customers. Still others believe these improvements, building largely on initiatives already underway prior to the inception of the DNI, are not enough – there is a need for more rapid and momentous advances in the community's capabilities. Many in the community argue the ODNI has been hampered by insufficient authorities – legal and financial – and lack of White House access and support. The position is further constrained because the DNI has no way to hold the individual heads of the agencies accountable, so that they in turn hold

their staffs accountable to the direction of the DNI. According to Patrick Neary in his retrospective of the IC, “while the community has improved in response to the call for intelligence reform, it remains fundamentally unreformed.”¹

Former 9/11 Commissioners Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton noted in January 2010 Senate testimony that the Commission’s intent for the DNI was to provide someone to lead the analytic community in connecting the dots: to “understand, manage, and integrate” the massive volumes of all-source data so that it becomes usable intelligence; and to help facilitate information sharing throughout the community, to avoid another significant intelligence failure. Hamilton said that while the community under the DNI had made strides in correcting the problems identified in the Commission report, the “terrorist incidents at Fort Hood and in the skies above Detroit” made it clear that there was still work to be done. According to Hamilton, “the DNI has been hobbled by endless disputes over its size, mission and authority.”²

In looking across the vast and extraordinarily complex Intelligence Community – and considering how it functioned before there was a Director of National Intelligence in comparison to how it functions today – there can be no doubt there is still, and likely always will be, room for improvement. But does this necessarily lead to the conclusion that the concept of the DNI is flawed or failing? If it is, given the amount of investment in people, dollars, time and effort, should the government walk away from it in favor of some other form of leadership or management? Is it possible that the real issue is not who is leading the community or how the community is led, but something more fundamental? In any case, the last thing the IC needs at this point is another significant change to detract it from its primary mission set. The one overarching concern of

everyone from the President and Congress, to the IC, to the military, to the man on the street is: how does the IC ensure there is not another significant failure by Intelligence to predict an event that would threaten the security of the nation and its allies?

In a study of past intelligence failures, James Finley wrote that “there is all too prevalent a tendency in American society (the press, the congress) to call anything less than clairvoyance a failure.” He further notes that “the time devoted to dissecting intelligence failures is indicative of the human frustration at not being able to predict the future with any consistent success.”³ That being the case, is it possible to guarantee there will not be another major intelligence failure on the part of the U.S. IC? Other than providing someone to hold accountable if the community does miss the next big event and taking the lead in improving policies, infrastructure, training and tradecraft, is there something one office can do to assure Congress and the American people the IC will be virtually all-knowing? Definitely not – so where does the nation go from here? In the sixth year of the ODNI, and with the fourth DNI beginning his tenure, it is worth a review of how the Office of the Director of National Intelligence came to be; and an acknowledgement that the position must have administration support for it to work effectively. It is also an opportune time to explore the effect of the position and the office on the IC, and recent changes that have had or may have an impact on the efficacy of the community; and to examine what the real issues are for IC reform – including a discussion of concrete steps that could be taken to drive the community forward and a little closer to achieving omniscience.

U.S. Intelligence Failures: Act 1

For more than 50 years, including through the Cold War, the U.S. IC operated under the National Security Act. The Act was signed into law by President Harry

Truman on 26 July 1947, largely in response to an “intelligence failure” that resulted in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941; an event which thrust the nation into World War II, forever altering the lives of most Americans. Much as the nation did after 9/11, people found the dissection of the intelligence failure that resulted in the bombing of Pearl Harbor not only morbidly fascinating, but also instructional for changing authorities and realigning the community.⁴ It was clear in the post analysis that the nation’s leaders were in possession of information that indicated an attack by the Japanese prior to the event. Although, as Roberta Wohlstetter astutely wrote in 1962, “there is a difference . . . between having a signal available somewhere in the heap of irrelevancies, and perceiving it as a warning; and there is also a difference between perceiving it as a warning, and acting or getting action on it.”⁵ The information available at the time, James Finley noted, was “fragmented, located in different agencies, or slowed in bureaucratic channels. There was no central clearing house for intelligence that could pull together the entire picture . . . There was no shortage of information that a [sic] attack was imminent. The question was where would it fall?”⁶ Significantly, the National Security Act created the National Security Council,⁷ the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as establishing what would later become the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Secretary of Defense.⁸ There were three key responsibilities given to the DCI: to provide “national intelligence . . . to the President and other senior officials, and ‘where appropriate,’ to Congress;” to establish collection and analysis priorities for and to lead the intelligence community through the development of the annual budget for the national intelligence programs; and to head the CIA.⁹

Post-Vietnam and pre-9/11, the IC waxed and waned in size, funding, and priorities. Through the late 1980s, the community enjoyed unprecedented growth as it fought the Cold War; and it suffered dramatic cuts in the early 1990s as the government reaped the “peace dividend” at the end of the Cold War.¹⁰ Through it all, each major intelligence agency was focused on its own mission, and its own intelligence collection specialty (INT).¹¹ There were many successful examples of intelligence sharing and community cooperation in the pre-9/11 years. The most recent and notable illustration occurred as the world approached the millennium: the community was on high alert, albeit to potential Y2K computer failures, but also in anticipation of terrorists whom it was thought might attempt to take advantage of those failures.¹² Information on potential terrorist attacks flowed between the FBI, the community, and state and local law enforcement. Close effective collaboration and information sharing internally, and with foreign partners, allowed the community to effectively connect the dots and head off a potential disaster. With the heightened alert came focus, and on 14 December 1999, “an Algerian jihadist was caught bringing a load of explosives into the United States.”¹³ Although some would argue that this success is attributed more to a watchful Customs and Border Protection officer acting on gut instinct rather than an intelligence tipoff, the fact is increased sharing no doubt contributed to a heightened alert on the part of U.S. border guards.

U.S. Intelligence Failures: Act 2

Unfortunately, little more than a year later on 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda operatives carried out a successful attack on the United States and the country went on the hunt to find some reasonable explanation for how the IC missed the signs that might have prevented it – something broken that could be fixed. As Roberta Wohlstetter said

of the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure, “after the event, of course, a signal is always crystal clear . . . but before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings.”¹⁴ In their investigation of the tragic event and other recent intelligence missteps, the 9/11 Commission found there were “failures and obstacles to sharing information among the federal partners charged with protecting the country.” Even if that information had been made available, there was no one focal point in the federal government accountable for fusing multi-source, domestic and foreign, intelligence – true all-source analysis that might have perceived the true nature of the warning and been able to convince the government to act on it.¹⁵

All-source analysis was and is the domain of the two organizations also responsible for Human Intelligence (HUMINT): the Department of Defense’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for tactical or military analysis, and the CIA for national strategic analysis. Those organizations rely primarily on finished reporting from the other largely single-INT intelligence agencies for inclusion in their all-source analysis.¹⁶ As the 9/11 Commission aptly described it, “The agencies are like a set of specialists in a hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms, and prescribing medications. What is missing is the attending physician who makes sure they work as a team.”¹⁷ While there is, and always has been, cross-collection queuing and multi-source sharing between analysts in the different agencies, it is not done through institutionalized processes or a result of formalized collection or analytic tradecraft, but rather is a result of intellectual, analytic curiosity – and as with many things in life, is largely personality driven. As noted in a RAND study of analysis in the IC, “analysts from one agency are not hostile to those in other agencies; they are mostly ignorant of one another.” There

was no central or institutionalized “focal point” for pulling together analysis on a particular topic.¹⁸ The DCI and CIA in their role as the President’s intelligence advisors and producers of the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) pulled single source items from the collection community for inclusion in the briefs, but that did not always translate to true integration or all-source analysis. The 9/11 Commission noted that from an analytic perspective, the CIA during the Cold War had the luxury of investing “time and resources in basic research, detailed and reflective . . . payoffs might not be immediate . . . but they could draw on a deep base of knowledge.” By the late 1990s, with access to the internet and twenty four hour news, the pace of analysis increased and the CIA and the community seemed to lose the craft of strategic analysis.¹⁹

The attacks of 9/11 were attributed to yet another monumental intelligence failure and the perception that the DCI was not leading the evolution of the IC in a way that allowed it to keep pace with the changing nature of transnational issues and threats, or technology. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report) stated that:

. . . The national security institutions of the U.S. government are still the institutions constructed to win the Cold War. The United States confronts a very different world today. Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United States confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries of traditional nation-states and call for quick, imaginative, and agile responses.²⁰

Further, it found that although the Central Intelligence Agency had once been “central” to the nation’s intelligence community, it had receded in importance and ability to influence “the use of the nation’s imagery and signals intelligence capabilities in [the] three national agencies housed within the Department of Defense: the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance

Office;” all of which had been under greater demand from their DoD masters since the 1991 Gulf War. The DCI himself, the study found, had too many weighty pulls on his time with his three critical jobs: running the CIA, managing the loosely federated intelligence agencies, and being the analyst in chief for the number one intelligence customer – the President – as the principal intelligence advisor. The commission’s sense was no recent DCI had been able to manage all three major functions effectively.²¹

Recognizing the quality of the workforce and the availability of resources, but looking at ways to “combine them more effectively” for “joint action” particularly focused on counterterrorism, the report called for substantial changes to the organization of the community to achieve “unity of effort.” It made five key recommendations:

- unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;
- unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;
- unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries;
- unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability; and
- strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.²²

Largely in response to these recommendations – in reaction to intelligence failures – on December 17, 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was signed into law, and the National Security Act of 1947 updated and amended accordingly.²³ Interestingly, the two Senate members who developed the IRTPA were not members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; nor did the House or Senate intelligence committees play an integral role in the legislation.²⁴ However, the IRTPA fundamentally changed the IC by establishing the position of the

Director of National Intelligence and reorganizing the management of the community, taking the function away from the DCI and focusing that position on managing the CIA. It further took the CIA's all-source analysis centers (the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), the Counter Proliferation Center (CPC), and the Open Source Center), and moved them under the DNI – adding “National” to their names; although the CIA retained a version of the CTC internal to the organization, which subsequently created overlap and confusion.

The DNI: the Solution?

The DNI position was created in part because the nation needed some viable articulation of what was broken in the government that allowed the tragedy of 9/11, coupled with a certain, visible fix that would prevent a disaster of that emotional magnitude from ever occurring again – and in this case, that meant realignment of the bureaucracy. It was perhaps convenient that the idea of a Director of National Intelligence was one that had been tossed around in the halls of Congress for some time; and although discounted previously, was available as a “quick fix” to the perceived problem/solution set.²⁵

The decision to create the DNI position also responded to the Commission's perception that the DCI, who was dual-hatted as the director of the CIA, was incapable of providing adequate leadership to the IC and the CIA at the same time – that the job was too big for one person and that the position lacked the necessary authorities to ensure effective coordination and integration. With the DCI at its helm, the IC was not able to share information or connect-the-dots well enough to avert 9/11. As noted in the Commission report, the DCI had limited power over the loosely confederated intelligence community and “in fact, the DCI's real authority has been directly

proportional to his personal closeness to the President . . . and to others in government, especially the secretary of defense.”²⁶

It is intriguing to note that as laid out in IRTPA and the updates to the National Security Act, the roles, responsibilities and structure of the DNI and the ODNI look very much like those of the DCI and the Community Management Staff – minus line management of the CIA. Similarities include the fact that the success and the ability of the position to direct the community would appear to be in direct proportion to its relationship with the President and the White House, not unlike the DCI position. Even the staffing (which has grown beyond original estimates in order to support the many challenging expectations of the office) is similar - large numbers of CIA personnel, and former personnel, moved to the ODNI structure to support its various roles; though many personnel were “begged, borrowed, or stolen” from across the community to build up the “coordinating” staff.²⁷

While having effectively the same span of control the Commission believed was too big for one person in the role of the DCI, the challenges for the DNI are compounded by the fact that the legal authorities of the position are somewhat ambiguous, and the legislation did not clearly articulate specifically which DCI responsibilities devolved to the DNI and which to the director of the CIA.²⁸ As an example, there is no question the DNI is the President’s principal advisor on intelligence matters and as such is responsible for all-source analysis that informs the executive branch; but as this has been the traditional purview of the CIA – and provided them regular access to the President, it has been difficult for the agency to accept this

“diminution” of responsibilities as that duty devolved to ODNI.²⁹ Mike Hayden, former Principal Deputy DNI and DCIA, pointed out that:

Even in the best of times, the DNI-DCIA relationship is a challenging one. The law puts the former at the center of the American intelligence community. History and tradition and even many current operations suggest the DCIA, however, has pride of place, and the agency’s collective culture is very reluctant to admit otherwise.³⁰

The resulting confusion has led to more than a few tussles between the ODNI and the CIA, the most visible of which was an unfortunate bureaucratic battle between DNI Blair and DCIA Panetta regarding which of the two was responsible for appointing America’s overseas intelligence chiefs. It was a perfect opportunity for the White House to clarify the position of the DNI for the entire community. Unfortunately, the issue came to a head along with two other turf issues: the DNI’s “determination to name the intelligence community representative at National Security Council meetings, even when CIA issues were central;” and the DNI’s belief that because he would be held accountable by the administration and the public for CIA covert actions, whether successful or a failure, he should be informed of operations rather than CIA dealing directly, and only, with the White House. While this was an opportunity to unequivocally and publically clarify, and demonstrate support for, the role of the DNI in the community, the Administration did not. According to Walter Pincus, writing in the Washington Post:

CIA station chiefs would continue to serve concurrently as DNI representatives – a well-publicized CIA win. [The DNI] will name the intelligence community representatives to NSC meetings, but the White House retains the right to call CIA personnel – a not-publicized DNI win. On covert actions and their oversight, the CIA would continue to deal directly with the White House but must report oversight findings also to the DNI. And [the DNI], when requested by the White House, will undertake strategic oversight, meaning the director will evaluate effectiveness on whether the operations meet national policy objectives. This was a more complicated split decision, but one that the CIA claims as a victory.³¹

The White House did not provide strong backing for the DNI in these issues. And they certainly did not back DNI Blair in the wake of the attempted bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas day in 2009 – another failure of the IC to connect-the-dots. In the spring of 2010, DNI Blair resigned.³²

In the run up to, and in the aftermath of, Blair's resignation, there was a great deal of analysis of the challenges facing the DNI in the IC. The big rocks standing in the way of success of the DNI included a paucity of political backing for budget and personnel authority to compensate for that which was deficient in the legislation. There are some who feel that if there has been so little progress, so few demonstrations of tangible results in spite of having strong, competent, and proven leaders in the role, that it may be time to consider a different restructuring of the community or a return to the old organization chart with the DCI leading the confederated IC.³³ Mike Hayden said of the position, "good people often overcome weak structures. But consistently relying on extraordinary heroism for routine success is hardly wise policy . . . especially . . . in an area as critical as intelligence."³⁴ Kean and Hamilton said in their January 2010 testimony that they have "studied the effectiveness of the DNI," and "believe the DNI has achieved a meaningful measure of success in its first years – that has made it worth the inevitable turmoil – but is a work in progress closer to the beginning of reform than to the end."³⁵ Paul Pillar, noting the position of DNI "has had an unhappy five-year history" said the position "sold as a fix to assuage national anguish about terrorism, is, to put it succinctly, a lemon."³⁶ He goes on to say, however, "recognition that [the] previous reorganization was not well thought-out does not constitute a case for

rescinding it now. We cannot turn back the clock and undo past mistakes; we can only limit additional damage.”³⁷

Although the IC has continually shown it can adapt to change, making yet another major organizational change will only add more costly disruptions and confusion at a time when the American people really need the community to just get on with its work. In any case, it is unlikely that major reorganizations at the top of the community will address the real, underlying issues that cause intelligence failures. As Pillar noted in his article, “no reorganization will eliminate the tenacity with which determined adversaries safeguard secrets or the impossibility of reliably forecasting foreign decisions yet to be made. No amount of bureaucratic engineering will enable intelligence services to achieve the omniscience that Americans . . . seem to expect of them.”³⁸

So What Is the Problem?

There are unquestionably adjustments that need to be made to the role of the DNI to make it more effective, and to unambiguously demonstrate the DNI is in charge of the Intelligence Community. Some modifications are underway. When James Clapper, Jr. was confirmed as the fourth DNI in August of 2010, he took the position with full knowledge of the challenges of the job and the office. He said in his response to Post Hearing Questions that he had shared with the President when offered the job, the “need for clarity in the roles and responsibilities of the DNI and other members of the national security and intelligence team . . . as intelligence is an enterprise of complementary capabilities which must be synchronized.” He noted that, in his opinion, “the DNI has a great deal of authority already, but the issue has been how that authority is asserted” and that he intends to “push the envelope” in this area.³⁹ To the issue of the

lack of White House support and appropriate congressional oversight for the DNI, DNI Clapper said he believes there must be a healthy, constructive relationship between the DNI and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, further noting “a positive relationship with the White House and . . .with the Congress, particularly the two oversight committees, can do a lot to compensate for the alleged frailties and ambiguities of the office. . .”⁴⁰ He further acknowledged the lack of clarity between the roles of the DNI and the DCIA, stating that he intended to overcome that by maintaining a “close and continuing relationship with the CIA Director.”⁴¹

While a “close and continuing” CIA connection is certainly necessary, it will not do enough to clarify the roles and responsibilities between CIA and DNI, and eliminate confusion for the other major intelligence agencies. That will require moving the CIA, along with the other national agencies (the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Security Agency) (NSA)), directly under the DNI, with shared responsibility for hiring and firing the heads of the Defense agencies with the Secretary of Defense. In this situation, the CIA director should no longer be a “congressionally confirmed presidential appointee; no other head of a major community element is.”⁴² This change would go a long way to cleaning up the lines of responsibility, eliminating some of the friction surrounding who is in charge, and clearing any fog, or confusion, about that from outside the community both at home and abroad.

To take this one step further, the administration should provide the DNI, who is responsible for leading the community in executing White House and Congressional

direction, with genuine budget authority. The National Intelligence Program (NIP), which includes funding for CIA and NSA as well as other IC agencies, and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) are both buried in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget. In November 2010, DNI Clapper announced he had “secured at least a conceptual agreement with the Secretary of Defense” to move the \$53 billion NIP out of the Defense budget noting that it “gives ODNI a lot more authority and oversight” over the budget providing the DNI more ability to ensure programs are being executed in accordance with national priorities.⁴³ With these changes, the DNI could and should be held accountable to the President and the Congress for the community. The DoD would retain significant authority over the national agencies and influence over the community “through its dual-hatted Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD (I)) (also the Director for Defense Intelligence, or DDI, under the DNI), and by retaining the Military Intelligence Program.”⁴⁴

Finally, there are changes that need to be made to the internal workings of the ODNI itself, which has grown beyond what is reasonably needed to orchestrate and integrate the community for unity of effort. During an October 2010 speech, DNI Clapper was asked how he, unlike DCIs before him, will resolve the tensions between managing the complexities of the IC and the “substantive responsibilities of being the President’s intell analyst.” DNI Clapper noted that his “most daunting challenge” is time management, saying that he is in the process of restructuring the ODNI “to better enable the DNI to attend to both those responsibilities.”⁴⁵ DNI Clapper is reportedly collapsing the ODNI staff, delegating some functions to other parts of the community to be executed on behalf of the DNI, and merging key positions. As an example, DNI

Clapper announced that in order to improve collaboration between collection and analysis, he will have one deputy director for intelligence integration where previously there had been one each for the two disciplines. His principal deputy will be the chief operating officer responsible for managing the staff.⁴⁶

It appears the current DNI, with the advantage of five years retrospective analysis of the intent of the IRTPA legislation and the difficulties inherent in it, is fully cognizant of and tackling at least some of the aspects of his position that have been troublesome for previous DNIs. This would be an appropriate opportunity for the administration to take a hard look at the intent of the position and make some additional improvements. Even with changes, however, the reality is that no single person or office will cause the IC to move closer to omniscience and ensure it is able to predict the next 9/11 or Fort Hood shooting, or even the next Middle East nation to protest its government.

As DNI Clapper and others have noted, to protect our nation – to provide vital intelligence – the IC must collect the right data and integrate information from all sources. Arguably more important than perceived failures on the part of the community to share information across the multiple INTs is the inability to deal with the volumes of data, much of it chaff. One of the members of the 9/11 Commission noted in testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee in January 2010 that “the real challenge is how do you understand, manage, and integrate [the] vast amount of information . . . to ensure the right people are seeing it in time to make a difference.”⁴⁷ For the U.S. IC, that “vastly complicates the legal, security, policy, privacy, and technical requirements because of different rules governing different kinds of intelligence.”⁴⁸ To really get at the

heart of the issue in order to make constructive improvements would take a daunting multi-year review of all of the relative legislation. Daunting or not – that initiative must be undertaken. In the short term, however, even within the legal constraints, there are clearly areas where the community can improve on integration or unity of effort in order to ensure the dots are connected and valid intelligence distributed. With DNI leadership, in addition to working on collaborative technical capabilities and compatible data architectures, more fundamentally, the community must work to institutionalize, teach, and enforce processes for collaboration and sharing, and must focus on joint efforts to improve all-source analysis.

Is There a Solution?

Previous DNIs have cited several major initiatives they believe are bringing the IC closer to effective integration and greater knowledge: joint duty assignments, a National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C), and Analytic Transformation.⁴⁹ While these initiatives are movement in the right direction, they will not fundamentally transform the community or its analytic efforts without full support from each of the affected agencies – which to date, could not be and have not been held accountable by the DNI.

The NIC-C was established to provide the DNI with a way to optimize strategic management of the national collection enterprise. However, it built on the existing National Intelligence Collection Board (NICB), which has been coordinating collection for 16 years. There has been marginal improvement in looking at the overall collection posture through the development of Unified Collection Strategies which provide an in-depth study by analysts and collection experts of the IC's hardest intelligence targets.

Managing disparate collection apparatus with completely different requirements and tasking mechanisms in an integrated, agile way will be challenging at best, but combining analysis and collection under a DNI Deputy for Integration may at least allow better direction across those disparate systems.⁵⁰

Again, while these initiatives have the potential to be useful, there may be something even more fundamental the community can do to improve its predictive analysis capabilities and its ability to work with unity of effort. It comes down to how to effectively manage and integrate the enormous volumes of data collected by the community in order to connect the dots; perform solid tactical and strategic analysis; and provide or share viable, actionable information with national, law enforcement – at the national, state, local, and tribal level - and military tactical customers. Someone must be in charge of leading the joint community effort. At the highest levels, the current DNI, in addition to working on improving his ability to manage the community writ large has collapsed the roles of the national intelligence officers and mission managers to reduce duplication and provide focused leadership for key regional and subject areas. While this is useful in that it “slim things down” at the ODNI, more importantly, it gives the community clarity on roles and responsibilities – and a focal point for integration in vital areas.⁵¹

Drawing further on that, it is well understood that between the different Intelligence Agencies that there are legal, technical, and cultural barriers to effective sharing and integration – none of which are going to be removed in the immediate future. However, as with a finely tuned orchestra, the whole is far greater than the sum of its parts. “The U.S. intelligence community already possesses unequalled human,

technological, and financial resources. What it is lacking is a philosophy to integrate these capabilities into a combined effort.”⁵² The 9/11 Commission Report cited the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols act, which mandated joint command for the military, as having applicable lessons for the IC in its success at lessening competition and increasing cooperation across the different military services. IRTPA specifically called for a comparable program for the IC. The ODNI drew from the existing Intelligence Community Assignment Program (ICAP) to build the Joint Intelligence Community Duty Assignment Program (JDA) to give IC personnel an opportunity to work in a completely different environment in the community to develop a better understanding of the broader mission and to improve jointness. However, unlike the military with its Joint Combatant Commands, the IC does not have true joint civilian intelligence commands. Perhaps the closest thing the IC has to joint combatant commands are the national functional centers: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC), and National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX).

Rather than focusing on JDAs, which today target more senior personnel and do little to stimulate real unity of effort across the IC, the DNI must lead the community to move down a level and focus on fundamental changes to the way it does analysis. While no one wants another major reorganization in the IC, there is a need to find a way to bring analysts together to improve the timeliness, completeness, and quality of short-term tactical, long-term strategic, and in-depth predictive analysis. One way to do that is to eliminate duplicative all-source analysis cells and to require all the IC Agencies to comprehensively bring analysts together in the existing national all-source centers and in community target-focused pursuit teams. The community cannot let the challenging

realities of the Capital Beltway inhibit analytic collaboration and joint duty opportunities; it must creatively leverage modern technology and capabilities and encourage virtual as well as physical joint duty, all-source analysis programs. With NGA and other government organizations moving to new facilities in the near future, there may be an opportunity to recapitalize on more centrally located buildings to bring analytic teams together - not to form a separate agency, but to function as Joint All-Source analysis teams and fusion centers.⁵³ These Joint All-Source analysis teams would fall under the DNI, with the Agency heads responsible for, as the Services are in the military model, funding, staffing, equipping and training to a common or joint standard. For this to be effective, it must be made a mandatory policy requirement that analysts participate in these joint duty assignments at least once in their career. It will not be effective without support from each of the individual Agencies, and the CIA in particular. Whether it agrees with it or not, the CIA must acknowledge that the DNI is the President's Intelligence Advisor and that the entire IC has information to contribute to all-source analysis. As David Ignatius pointed out, now "the DNI controls the daily flow of analysis to the executive branch." He goes on to say that "over time, that means the role traditionally played by CIA analysts should flow to the DNI – so that we have an elite cadre of all-source analysts similar Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee."⁵⁴ While an elite cadre of all-source analysts is needed to prepare intelligence reporting for the administration, it is also imperative that cadre is informed by true all-INT, all-source analysis performed by the national centers and joint analysis teams.

To further enhance the effectiveness of analysis, the community must cultivate analysts who have both depth of knowledge on specific subject areas as well as those

with a broader understanding of the target sets and transnational issues. It is critical to promote analysts with longevity and deep understanding of key targets, and to encourage them to work with and nurture new analysts who bring fresh perspectives on targets and technology. This is true not only in the individual agencies, but is even more important in the joint analysis centers. Bringing analysts from the individual INTs and all-source analysis together at varying times in their careers has the added advantage of enhancing their knowledge of the broader community and resources, providing them a network of analysts with whom to consult, and enhancing common analytic practices and sharing across the IC. It will also lead to a more joint philosophy on analysis and improved joint feedback to the collection requirements process and the individual collectors.

Conclusion

It is important to acknowledge that the position of the DNI, due to challenges in authorities and resistance from the community, to date has had limited impact on bringing the IC together. That does not mean, however, that the position should be restructured or eliminated. Rather, there are legislative changes and increased support needed to facilitate the success of the position. With the recent changes to the position and rightsizing of the ODNI, the DNI is on a better trajectory to bring renewed energy to the daunting task of affecting viable improvements to the community. While certainly much more is needed, there is a more fundamental change that has the potential to significantly enhance the ability of the IC to integrate data and connect the dots. Requiring the community's intelligence analysts to perform joint duty cross INT, all-source analysis throughout their careers, perhaps more than technological changes, senior level reorganizations, or enhancements to the role of the DNI and ODNI, will

move the community closer to omniscience - an ability to collect, process, integrate, and analyze large volumes of collected data and to connect the dots to form a coherent intelligence story. Short of revolutionary changes in policy or technology removing barriers to enhanced sharing across the community – which must happen, regardless of the significant time, cost, and effort required – cultivating improved cross community all-source analysis is the best way to improve the community’s ability to predict the next big “thing” whether it is another 9/11 or an Egyptian call for democracy or a change in Chinese grand strategy - and avoid another major intelligence failure.

Endnotes

¹ Patrick Neary, “Intelligence Reform, 2001 – 2009: *Requiescat in Pace?*,” *Studies in Intelligence* 54, no. 1 (March 2010): 1.

² U.S. Congress, Senate, Commerce Committee, *Bipartisan Policy Center, Congressman Lee Hamilton and Governor Tom Kean Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee*, (January 20, 2010): 3.

³ James P. Finley, ed., U.S. Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook, “*The Uncertain Oracle: Some Intelligence Failures Revisited*” (U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, Fort Huachuca, AZ, 1995), 377.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 378.

⁵ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 389.

⁶ Finley, “The Uncertain Oracle,” 378 – 379.

⁷ The NSC Page on the White House Website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc> (accessed December 23, 2010). “The National Security Council (NSC) is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. Since its inception under President Truman, the Council’s function has been to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The Council also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.”

⁸ Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 1.

⁹ Congressional Research Report, *Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 26 2010), 1.

¹⁰ “The peace dividend is a political slogan popularized by US President George H.W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the early 1990s, purporting to describe the economic benefit of a decrease in defense spending. It is used primarily in discussions relating to the guns versus butter theory. The term was frequently used at the end of the Cold War, when many Western nations significantly cut military spending.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_dividend

¹¹ The U.S. Intelligence Community, pre-9/11, could be broken into 3 categories. The National Intelligence Agencies include(d) the National Security Agency (NSA), which performs signals collection and analysis; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), responsible for imagery collection and analysis; the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which develops, acquires, and launches systems for intelligence collection. The Departmental Intelligence Agencies include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the intelligence entities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State; the Office of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence of the Department of Treasury; the Office of Intelligence and Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice; the Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy; and the Directorate of Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) and Directorate of Coast Guard Intelligence of the Department of Homeland Security. And the last, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which performs human source collection, all-source analysis and advanced science and technology research. The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence included the Officer of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, the Community Management Staff, the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, the National Intelligence Council, and other community offices. Lee Hamilton, Thomas Kean, et al., *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington, DC: The 9/11 Commission, 2004), 407 – 408.

¹² Ibid., 174.

¹³ Hamilton, *Final Report of the National Commission*, 176.

¹⁴ Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 387.

¹⁵ Commerce Committee, *Bipartisan Policy Center, Congressman Lee Hamilton and Governor Tom Kean Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee*, 3.

¹⁶ Hamilton, *Final Report of the National Commission*, 406 – 407.

¹⁷ Hamilton, *Final Report of the National Commission*, 353.

¹⁸ Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, *Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis* (RAND National Security Division, 2008), 1.

¹⁹ Hamilton, *Final Report of the National Commission*, 90.

²⁰ Hamilton, *Final Report of the National Commission*, 399.

- ²¹ Hamilton, *Final Report of the National Commission*, 409.
- ²² Hamilton, *Final Report of the National Commission*, 400.
- ²³ Office of General Counsel, *Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book*, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Summer 2009).
- ²⁴ Michael V. Hayden, "The State of the Craft: Is Intelligence Reform Working?," *World Affairs* (September/October 2010): 3.
- ²⁵ Paul R. Pillar, "Unintelligent Design," *The National Interest*, August 24, 2010 <http://nationalinterest.org/article/unintelligent-design-3918> (accessed December 13, 2010), 2.
- ²⁶ Hamilton, *Final Report of the National Commission*, 86.
- ²⁷ Christopher K. Tucker, "Dual Hat Panetta: Leon Panetta Should be Appointed Both DNI and DCIA," *The Washington Note by Steve Clemons*, May 26, 2010, http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/05/dual_hat_panett/ (accessed December 13, 2010).
- ²⁸ Pillar, "Unintelligent Design," 5.
- ²⁹ David Ignatius, "Intelligence Turf War Has to be Reconciled," *The Commercial Appeal*, June 14, 2009, <http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2009/jun/14/david-ignatius-intelligence-turf-war-has-to-be/> (accessed December 13, 2010).
- ³⁰ Hayden, "The State of the Craft," 5.
- ³¹ Walter Pincus, "Settling an Intelligence Turf War," *The Washington Post*, November 17, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/16/AR2009111603636.html> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- ³² Hayden, "The State of the Craft," 6.
- ³³ Tucker, "Dual Hat Panetta;" Richard H. Smith, "One 'Spy Czar' Too Many?," *Huffington Post*, May 28, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-h-smith/one-spy-czar-too-many_b_592926.html, (accessed December 13, 2010).
- ³⁴ Hayden, "The State of the Craft," 7.
- ³⁵ Commerce Committee, *Bipartisan Policy Center, Congressman Lee Hamilton and Governor Tom Kean Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee*, 4.
- ³⁶ Pillar, "Unintelligent Design," 2 – 3.
- ³⁷ Pillar, "Unintelligent Design," 8.
- ³⁸ Hayden, "The State of the Craft," 6. Pillar, "Unintelligent Design," 8.

³⁹ *U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence Website*, “Post Hearing Questions for James R. Clapper,” <http://intelligence.senate.gov/100720/clapperpost.pdf> (accessed November 6, 2010) 3.

⁴⁰ *U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence*, “Post Hearing Questions for James R. Clapper,” 13.

⁴¹ *U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence*, “Post Hearing Questions for James R. Clapper,” 12.

⁴² Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 10.

⁴³ Ellen Nakashima, “Control of Intelligence Budget will Shift,” *Washington Post Online*, November 3, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/02/AR2010110207136.html>, (accessed November 9, 2010); Steven Aftergood, “A Step Towards Intelligence Budget Reform,” *Secrecy News*, November 3, 2010, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2010/11/budget_reform.html (accessed November 9, 2010).

⁴⁴ Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 11.

⁴⁵ *Office of the Director of National Intelligence Website*, “Remarks and Q&A by Director of National Intelligence Mr. James Clapper on the State of Domestic Intelligence Reform,” http://www.odni.gov/speeches/20101006_speech_clapper.pdf (accessed November 6, 2010) 8.

⁴⁶ Nakashima, “Control of Intelligence Budget will Shift.”

⁴⁷ Commerce Committee, *Bipartisan Policy Center, Congressman Lee Hamilton and Governor Tom Kean Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee*, 4.

⁴⁸ *U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence*, “Post Hearing Questions for James R. Clapper,” 6.

⁴⁹ Analytic Transformation is meant to improve the daily analytic interaction and collaboration across the community by focusing on integrated analytic operations, mission management at the community level, and enhanced quality of analytic products. Integrated operations includes networked based solutions such as an authoritative repository of disseminated intelligence (the Library of National Intelligence), a common analytic workspace (A-Space), a discovery toolset or complex search capability to address data overload (Catalyst), and a variety of other efforts. Processes for collection and analytic resource management are included in the mission management capabilities; and tradecraft training and analytic standards are addressed under enhancing the products. *Office of the Director of National Intelligence Website*, “Analytic Transformation,” http://www.odni.gov/content/AT_Digital%2020080923.pdf (accessed January 9, 2011).

⁵⁰ Neary, “Intelligence Reform.” and DNI webpage for NIC-C

⁵¹ Nakashima, “Control of Intelligence Budget will Shift.”

⁵² James J. Wirtz and Jon J. Rosenwasser, "From Combined Arms to Combined Intelligence: Philosophy, Doctrine and Operations," *Intelligence and National Security* (December 16, 2010): 727 and 737, in *Informaworld* (accessed February 1, 2011).

⁵³ Neary, "Intelligence Reform," 13.

⁵⁴ Ignatius, "Intelligence Turf War Has to be Reconciled."